Immutable destinations
A deployed vault can release only to its configured beneficiary wallets. There is no administrator function for replacing them.
Security model
Designed so CryptoWill cannot take control.
The core safety objective is constrained authority: no CryptoWill account can hold a user's keys, redirect beneficiaries, approve a claim or override the original holder.
Contract controls
Protection comes from explicit limits.
Holder-only intervention
Only the original holder address can reject an active claim or terminate the vault before release.
Professional participation
Meeting the numerical threshold is insufficient unless the designated professional attestor has also approved.
Delayed release
Approval starts an intervention window rather than producing an immediate transfer.
Pull-based claims
Beneficiaries claim their own allocations after release becomes available, reducing reliance on a central operator.
Public provenance
The interface checks contract version and factory origin before presenting a vault as supported.
Operational security
The contract is only one part of the system.
Use dedicated hardware-wallet accounts for every real-value participant. Seeds and private keys never enter CryptoWill.
Attestors must use separately controlled wallets and recovery processes. Shared seeds undermine multi-party approval.
Every address must be checked on a trusted device display. Participants should rehearse the complete flow on Sepolia.
If a configured wallet may be compromised, the holder should terminate the vault and create a new configuration.
Before production
What still has to happen.
- Independent smart-contract audit and remediation review
- UK legal and regulatory scope confirmed by external counsel
- Controlled pilot procedures with participating professional firms
- Incident response, monitoring and continuity rehearsals
- Human-readable hardware-wallet signing review